Development Strategies of NGOs: Rights-Based Approach Vs Charity Approach

Development Strategies of NGOs: Rights-Based Approach Vs Charity Approach 

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Introduction

Human rights-based approach (HRBA) has become increasingly important in tackling existing inequality at different settings. 

Human Rights-Based Approach and Charity-Based Approach

This section introduces and compares the human rights-based approach (HRBA) and its counter approach, charity-based approach. In the discourse of development, the HRBA is one of the new approaches that highlight cross-cutting issues. For instance, environment-based approach is one of the emerging approaches in development. Incorporating human rights terminologies has increasingly become popular as well as other cross-cutting issues. The following example of the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) is illustrative for this trend:

In the past, the terms used were aid or development assistance, or that Sweden sent money to the poor. Today, the term used is development cooperation since it is a matter of cooperation rather than providing money: cooperation between people, between international bodies such as the UN and EU, and between the peoples and governments of countries. It is not a matter of charity, but a matter of the right of people to avoid being poor (SIDA, 2005) (emphasis added).

Both “charity” and “rights” are often taken for granted, which leaves significant space of interpretation and thus difficult for analysing more concretely the actual impact of the selection of both the terminology and the approach as a practical tool beyond the general image of them. This section, therefore, firstly defines historically predominant charity-based approach, which follows the definition of the HRBA both in narrow and wider senses. This section elaborates these two key approaches so as to better understand the general setting of the following main part.    

The charity-based approach has a long history. It can go as far back as Medieval time, for instance in England, when religious groups established hospitals for “people in need” (Brenton, 1985). More modern use of the word, charity, means benevolent giving by those who have more to those who have less. The important implications here lie in the power relationship between the givers and receivers where givers voluntarily make decisions to fill the gaps of the needs of the receivers or so-called “beneficiaries.” The decision making power of the beneficiaries, therefore, hardly exists in this approach. Despite the positive image of charity, charity organisations and the charity-based approach that have historically served to innovatively fill the gaps of existing needs. Nevertheless, this approach has been heavily criticised because it gives the impression that the problems have been solved, and does not challenge the fundamental structure which is the root causes of the situation and also because of the mechanism to take away the decision making power and/or ownership from the beneficiaries. The criticism is found both in Disability Studies (Barnes, 1991 etc.) and in Development Studies (Murphy, 2000 etc.).

The HRBA is rapidly replacing the charity-based one, at least in the discourse, to overcome the shortcomings and to change the paradigm of any intervention with various significances, at least in theory. The HRBA is often understood in the legal framework in a narrow definition. For instance, discriminated and awared people file a court case when their rights are violated. This justiciability is mentioned often as a core part of this approach (Teranaka, 2006: 81). It is often understood as a normative strategy based on the international laws as norms (Seppänen, 2005:8). Thus when the HRBA is narrowly defined, it has a strong linkage to international law (ibid.33) as well as national legislations. On the one hand, the linkage to international law is a powerful tool when all countries have ratified at least one of the seven core United Nations human rights treaties and 80% of states have ratified four or more (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006:5). On the other hand, the linkage to national laws also demands certain procedure to the involved actors.

Wider definition conceptualises the HRBA in a variety of ways in the operationalisation outside of law discipline. It could be both means (Frostell, 2006:3), and goal (Uvin, 2004:123). The process is prioritised (ibid. 165), which is catered to the principles of empowerment, participation, non-discrimination and accountability with the priority on vulnerable people (Lundström-Sarelin and Mustaniemi-Laakso, 2007). That is, the process becomes participatory and transparent with equality in decision making and sharing of the outcomes of the process among involved stakeholders (Sengupta, 2000b: 21-22 cited in Uvin 2004). The analysis with the HRBA can give an insight into the distribution of power as a result (OHCHR, 2006:27). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is one of the main actors promoting the HRBA to development cooperation. This paper reflects the definition of the HRBA by the OHCHR (2006).

The distinction between the charity-based approach and the HRBA can be simplified and summarised in the following Table 1. However, as Lundström-Sarelin and Mustaniemi-Laakso (2007) also cautiously claim that the dichotomy is not crystal-clear, one has to bear in mind that there is a great risk of over-simplicity and even the question of dichotomy in itself, which are to be argued further in the following main part of the text.

Table 1. Distinction between the Charity-based Approach and the HRBA

	Goal	Individuals	Responsibilities based on
Charity-Based Approach	Filling the gaps of (often material) needs	Objects of charity, “Beneficiaries”	Discretion of givers, no obligations
Human Rights-Based Approach	Fulfilling aimed human rights in a human rights-sensitive manner	Subjects as rights-holders as well as duty-bearers in different contexts	National and international law-oriented obligations and accountability for fulfilling the rights of individuals

Inspired by (Lundström-Sarelin and Mustaniemi-Laakso, 2007) and created by the author.

Downside of the Human Rights-Based Approach in General

Despite the theoretical strength of this approach as was mentioned in the previous section, this approach is not free from pitfalls. This section explores the downside of this approach in general terms without any specific context. The criticisms towards this approach in general are mainly three-fold: 1) its origin, 2) problems in its operationalisation, and 3) negative consequences of its operationalisation. This section analyses these three main pitfalls.

Possibility of Cultural Imperialism

Although principles of human rights concepts such as non-discrimination and equality are not exclusive values only for Western countries, it is feared that human rights discourse is not as effective elsewhere as in Europe due to its origin in the West (Kennedy, 2004:18, Uvin, 2004:17). This part introduces the development of this approach, which is the foundation of the criticism.

Human rights era is said to have started with the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 (Seppänen, 2005:10) when peace and prosperity were on the agenda after the World War Two. Due to the Cold War between East and West, human rights were too bound to the political ideologies until the end of the Cold War. For instance, Uvin (2004: 14) categorises three generations of human rights: first generation is on civil and political rights which is also cited as “negative rights” not to degrade rights particularly by the states as duty-bearers around civil and political rights. This generation was centred to the West. The second generation, on the other hand, is on economic, social and cultural rights which are cited as “positive rights” including adequate standard of living. This was USSR-centred. Both generations were meant for individual rights. The third generation of human rights is collective or solidarity rights such as rights to development and self-determination, latter of which is to do with decolonisation from the 1960s onwards and both of which subsequently entered into non-Western context and into the realm of development particularly after the 1990s. The emergence of the HRBA coincided with the demise of neo-liberal policies (Seppänen, 2005:13) as a criticism against economic-centred development policy and practice. The HRBA finally became mainstream in 2000 with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s “2000 Report on Human Rights and Human Development” where human rights became development objectives rather than an instrument for economic growth (ibid. 15).

Due to its origin outside of development context, application of the HRBA to development is criticised as “globalization of policy making” with the use of Western power (Kennedy, 2004:111), while various modalities of development interventions themselves are criticised for their cultural imperialism. The state-centred discourse is also partly explained due to the origin in the West where the states have the obligation for their “citizens”. This Eurocentrism has not paid enough attention to cultural relativism, which is thus criticised due to its possibility of cultural imperialism. This point is articulated further in the following sub-chapter on operationalisation-related downsides.

Challenges of Operationalisation

Kennedy (2004) and Uvin (2004:19) are sceptical to the human rights and further criticise the HRBA due to the little operationalisation of this approach despite the wide recognition and mainstreaming of this theme. Kennedy (2004:21-22) claims that “rights conflict with one another, rights are vague, rights have exceptions, many situations fall between rights.” Batliwala (2007) also argues that the approach lacks the transformative power of the real thing. In this sub-chapter, the practice of the HRBA is investigated to clarify the downsides in its operationalisation process. Criticisms are mainly three-fold: 1) irresponsibility for intervention, 2) priority making and 3) cultural insensitivity.

Firstly, human rights talk is criticised for its irresponsibility for intervention (Kennedy 2004:30). Human rights language is absolutism. Few would oppose the idea (Seppänen, 2005:85). Nevertheless, the discourse itself does not provide operational guidance for making the aimed change (Uvin, 2004:30-31). For instance, “human rights are indivisible and interdependent (OHCHR, 2006:2)” in principle. However, when it comes to practice, operationalisation mechanism is weak (Seppänen, 2005:34). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for instance, states “appropriate” measures to be taken with “available resources (article 2)” and “in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources (CESCR, 1990).” This allows significant room of interpretation without practical implications. When certain context is taken into account for the operationalisation process, this weakness becomes the fundamental challenge right away because situational analysis, identification of structural problems and other important analysis are all left behind to the implementers. Such analysis is extremely complex (Alston, 2005:803) but yet undermined. Without implementation tools, this approach is criticised to remain in the “moral high ground” (Uvin, 2002&4).

Secondly, priority making is also a challenge. “The priority must be given to the most marginalized (OHCHR, 2006:24)” in principle. All rights are equally important, whereas “the principle of ‘progressive realisation’ recognizes that some rights may have to be given priority over others, because not all rights can be fulfilled at the same time or at the same place (ibid.12).” This argument is particularly valid when the context is resource-constraint Southern country. In reality, “trade-offs” at the expense of the less privileged often takes place (Kennedy, 2004:17). Human rights systems have historically benefited the well-off because human rights depend very significantly on the power relations that exist within the society or the group (Alston, 2005:806). Frostell (2006) indicates the male-dominant or gender-neutral understanding of human rights is the mainstream, while Seppänen (2005:93) points out the states’ legal power over people. That is, already powerful actors such as the states have possibility to misuse this approach (Alston, 2005:767). This priority making processes and outcomes on the basis of the existing power relationship has the possibility to reinforce the status quo because the most vulnerable people are out of reach to the activities of the HRBA. Negative consequence of its operationalisation is further mentioned in the next sub-chapter.

Thirdly, human rights are vague (Seppänen, 2005:96) and culturally insensitive although cultural sensitivity is demanded for the operationalisation (OHCHR, 2006:5). In practice, the HRBA tends to be a top-down, one-size-fit-all-approach (Alston, 2005:767) and little attention is paid to background social, political and historical conditions (Kennedy, 2004:12; Batliwala, 2007:89). For instance, international policy, declaration and convention making has been destructing the implementation (Kennedy, 2004:118) when the policy making becomes an end in itself and does not follow its operationalisation in a culturally sensitive manner. This tendency of human rights to generalise has been heavily criticised (ibid.13).

These general downsides subsequently follow negative consequences in practice if enough attention is not paid to avoid these pitfalls.

Possible Negative Consequences of Its Operationalisation

When operationalisation of the HRBA has not been elaborated, negative consequences easily follow in practice. The room of diverse interpretation means different sets of consequences. This part analyses possible negative consequences particularly when narrow definition of the HRBA is applied.

When the HRBA is narrowly conceptualised as the legal formalisation, possible negative scenarios are the followings. Firstly, legal formalisation becomes the end in itself and not means. That is, “not health, but a right to health; not engagement, but declaration (Kennedy, 2004: 61)” are aimed at. After the law, convention and declaration making particularly at international level, no change might follow in practice when making of policy itself becomes the aspiration. For instance, in India, education for all is guaranteed by law and policy, while girls still dropout from schools (Batliwala, 2007). After all, demonstrating the consequences of international policies remains difficult (ibid. 123). Another negative consequence of narrowly defined HRBA in practice would be professionalisation for making needed changes. Kennedy (2004: 23) claims that human rights professionals benefit more rather than actually making changes such as decrease of violence against women, poverty and mass slaughter. When changes rely too much on professionals and lawyers, that consequently “alienate people from themselves and from the vocabulary of their own governance (ibid. 22).” When the professionals are from abroad, namely Western countries, then they “remain safely distant from” the concerns (ibid. 80) and eventually go back to home (ibid. 78) without dealing with series of possible unintended, negative consequences of their interventions. In this regard, the expected “emancipatory” impact of the HRBA cannot reach the emancipation of the concerned people by making necessary changes in practice. Particularly when the most disadvantaged groups of people are concerned, legal system and court are too often inaccessible due to their illiteracy, lack of information, unawareness of rights, financial deficiency and/or physical inaccessibility (see health issues for Lundström-Sarelin, 2007:470). The availability is then far from the concerned people who are supposed to benefit from the changes the most according to the rule of prioritising the most disadvantaged in the operationalisation of the HRBA.

More widely conceptualised HRBA also has possibility of negative consequence when human rights talk justifies and legitimises the use of force to another states and individuals (Kennedy, 2004: 25). The human rights as absolutism are also dangerous as it undermines other possibly legitimate means for making the aimed changes (ibid. 9, 14). This danger of actual disempowering of the people concerned and other possibly efficient means is predictable in theory if not enough attention is paid.